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Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
TECHNOLOGY APPROACH:
DoD VERSUS BOEING
(A COMPARATIVE STUDY)
A. Lee Battershell
This is an analysis of different approaches in the use of technology by Boeing
and DoD to determine how they may have affected development time for the
C-17 and the Boeing 777. Boeing’s focus on cost, schedule, performance,
and market competition is contrasted to DoD’s focus on performance. The
paper concludes that the mere existence of a technology should not obscure
(a) the impact its maturity may have on program cost and risk, (b) whether it
will meet a real need of the user as opposed to a gold plated one, and (c)
whether the added development time it may require could pose unanticipated
problems for the customer, or even result in fielding an obsolete weapons
systems.
hat are the differences in the way
private industry and Government
approach technology when developing
planes? Why does the Government
take longer than the private sector to develop
a plane?
There’s a perception that high technology
included in military planes contributes
significantly to the typical 11 to 21 years
(DiMascio, 1993) it takes the Department
of Defense (DoD) to develop, produce, and
deploy new military aircraft. To learn if it is
the technology that takes so long, this study
explores the way Boeing and DoD approached
technology in developing the
Boeing 777 and the military C-17. One reason
for selecting the C-17 is that it does not
have the complex weapons systems inher-
The advantage we had in Desert
Storm had three major components.
We had an advantage in people, an
advantage in readiness, and an advantage
in technology... We need to
preserve that part of the industrial
base which will give us a technological
advantage... (William Perry, Secretary
of Defense) (Mercer and
Roop, 1994).
...technology must earn its way on to
a Boeing [commercial] plane... In
short, our R&D efforts will continue
to be customer-driven, not technology-
driven (Philip Condit, Boeing
president, 1994).
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Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
ent in fighters or bombers, and yet it still
took more than 14 years to develop and
deliver. In contrast, it took little more than
four years to develop and deliver an operational
Boeing 777.
WHAT IS TECHNOLOGY?
According to Webster’s Dictionary, technology
is defined as “...an applied science
that includes the study of industrial arts one
can apply toward practical use” (Guralnik,
1980). Technology is a method or process
for handling a specific technical problem.
By contrast, natural science is: ...the study
of knowledge to understand the nature of
the subject matter which is being studied.
Its purpose is for the sake of understanding—
the application or usefulness may not
be self evident at that time. Technology is
the application of scientific breakthroughs
(Goldberg, 1995). When one speaks of a
technology breakthrough, one is defining a
new process or method for application of a
scientific breakthrough.
NEED FOR CHANGE
The Department of Defense is coping
with reduced resources and a changing
world. At home, the American public continues
to demand that its government become
more efficient, prompting Vice President
Al Gore to initiate a National Performance
Review to: “...make the entire federal
government both less expensive and
more efficient, and to change the culture
of our national bureaucracy away from complacency
and entitlement toward initiative
and empowerment...” (Gore, 1993).
The late Secretary of Defense Les Aspin
directed a “Bottom-Up Review” of DoD to
identify cost savings and improve efficiency
and effectiveness. In his final report Aspin
said: “We must restructure our acquisition
system to compensate for the decline in
available resources for defense investment
and to exploit technological advances in the
commercial sector of our economy more
effectively...”(Aspin, 1993).
Studies of DoD acquisition over the past
25 years reveal that (a) DoD’s way of doing
business resulted in programs that spanned
11 to 21 years (DiMascio, 1993), and that
(b) by the time the weapon systems were
finally delivered the technology was outdated.
Significantly, the lengthy time to develop
weapon systems was also directly
linked to a doubling of the costs originally
planned (Gansler, 1989). Based on this past
performance one might expect higher costs
in the future. Unfortunately, the ongoing
process of federal deficit reduction rules out
increased military spending. DoD must
learn not only to maintain the technological
superiority of the American military, but
learn to do so in less time and at less cost.
Assumptions
Jacques Gansler warned against DoD’s
continuing preoccupation with technology
without consideration of cost. Substitute
schedule for cost, and one could say the
same is true for time. As Gansler writes:
Ms. Battershell is a Research Fellow at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF)
in Washington, D.C. Prior to her work at ICAF, she was Director, Pentagon Liaison Office,
Air Force Audit Agency. She holds a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy and
a certificate from the Senior Acquisition Course, Defense Acquisition University. She is a
Certified Acquisition Professional Program Manager and a Certified Acquisition Professional
Financial Management Comptroller.
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Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
Until the DoD introduces affordability
[and schedule] constraints
into its requirements process and
shifts from a design-to-performance
approach to more of a design-to-cost
[and design-to-schedule] approach,
it will procure fewer and fewer
weapon systems each year, and eventually
the United States will not have
enough modern systems to present
a credible defense posture (Gansler,
1989). [parenthetical material added
to original]
It should not take 21 years to develop
and deliver a weapon system nor should
advanced technology cost as much as it
does. Gansler points out that performance
has improved in commercial as well as the
defense industry because of technology,
“...however, in the defense world costs have
risen along with performance.” Comparatively,
“...commercial computers, televisions,
and other items that use similar technology
have improved dramatically in performance
and gone down dramatically in
price,” (Gansler, 1989) and don’t take as
long to produce.
Methodology
This paper is a comparative analysis of
the way Boeing and DoD used technology.
The problem was to determine whether a
difference in DoD’s approach to technology
contributed to the length of time it took
to develop the C-17. This study is based on
written works (published and unpublished),
interviews, and observances.
Research for this report was primarily
focused on the DoD C-17 and the Boeing
777. It included an extensive review of literature
and interviews. The literature review
encompassed studies, laws, standards,
and articles relating to various approaches
to technology, their focuses and parameters.
The interviews were conducted with individuals
who were or had been involved with
the Boeing 777 or the Office of Secretary
of Defense (OSD). Additional conversations
with senior leaders at Boeing, the Air
Force, and DoD revealed their approaches
to technology use and their perceptions.
THE BOEING APPROACH
The 777 causes me to sit bolt upright
in bed periodically. It’s a hell of a
gamble. There’s a big risk in doing
things totally different. (Dean
Thornton, President, Boeing Commercial
Airplane Group, 1992)
(Main, 1992)
Boeing professed a belief that one
must approach technology with an
eye toward utility...it must earn its
way on... (Condit, 1994)
Boeing’s conservative approach was illustrated
in the 1970s and 1980s when it
decided not to include in its 767 more advanced
systems such as fly-by-wire, fly-bylight,
flat panel video displays, and advanced
propulsion systems (Holtby, 1986). Even
though the technology existed, Boeing did
not believe it was mature enough for the
767. Boeing also used what Gansler defines
as a design-to-cost constraint. After Boeing
defines a program it evaluates cost before
going into production. Its cost evaluations
include trade offs of performance, technology,
and manufacturing investments
(Boeing undated).
In the 1990s Boeing included in its 777
(a) fly-by-wire, (b) advanced liquid-crystal
flat-panel displays, (c) the company’s own
patented two-way digital data bus (ARINC
629), (d) a new wing the company advertised
as the most aerodynamically efficient
airfoil developed for subsonic commercial
aviation, (e) the largest and most powerful
engines ever used on a commercial airliner,
(f) nine percent composite materials in the
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Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
airframe, and (g) an advanced composite
empennage (Mulally, 1994). Boeing also
invested in new facilities to test the 777 avionics
(Proctor, 1994), and to manufacture
the composite empennage (Benson, 1995).
Did Boeing push the technology envelope
for the 777? Philip Condit, Boeing president,
said those were technology improvements,
not technology breakthroughs. He
used fly-by-wire technology to illustrate:
Fly-by-wire is interesting and you can
isolate it. But if you step back, our
autopilots are fly-by-wire and always
have been. We’ve given it a little bit
more authority [in the 777]. The 737
right from the start had what we
called a stick steering mode in which
you moved the control wheel to
make inputs to the auto pilot. Flyby-
wire. The 757 Pratt Whitney engine
was completely electronically
controlled... it makes neat writing,
but it’s not an order of magnitude
change. Designing the airplane with
no mock-up and doing it all on computer
was an order of magnitude
change (Condit, 1994).
One only has to review the history of airplane
technology during the 1980s to see
that Condit is right. Airbus and McDonnell
Douglas included fly-by-wire on the A340
(Nelson, 1994) and the C-17, respectively,
during the 1980s, and both experienced
problems. Boeing was able to learn from the
mistakes of Airbus and McDonnell Douglas
(Woolsey, 1994), and it had the advantage
of using new high-powered ultrafast
computer chips that increased throughput.
In fact Honeywell, the company that
McDonnell Douglas dismissed because it
couldn’t produce the fly-by-wire fast enough
for the C-17, was the company that successfully
installed it on the 777 (Woolsey,
1994)—but not without problems.
Boeing could not assemble and integrate
the fly-by-wire system until it solved problems
with the ARINC 693 databus, the
AIMS-driven Flight Management System,
and the software coding. Solving these problems
took more than a year longer than
Boeing anticipated. In order to maintain its
schedule, Boeing did as much as it could
without the complete system, then it used
red-label1 systems during flight tests. Finally,
the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) certified the last link, the primary
flight computer, in March, 1995. In April,
1995 the FAA certified the 777 as safe
(Acohido, 1995).
Technical Problems
While Boeing may not define its 777 avionics
problems as pushing the technology
envelope, Boeing did push the envelope on
its design and manufacturing process, and
its propulsion. As Condit said, “Designing
the airplane with no mock-up and doing it
all on computer was an order of magnitude
change.” When one is the first to use a technology
in a new way, one can expect problems.
Assuming that Boeing is conservative
in its approach, one must ask why Boeing
went from computer design to build with
no mock-up, and why it used new, large,
high-performance engines.
Computer and Aircraft Design
CATIA (Computer assisted three-dimensional
interactive application) is the
computer application that Boeing used to
design the 777 and improve its manufacturing
process (Benson, 1994). Jeremy Main
best described the reasons Boeing changed
1 A red-label system signifies that the system is still in the development and testing phase. A black-label
system signifies that hardware and software are finished and ready for production.
217
Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
its way of design and manufacture using
CATIA in his article, Betting on the 21st Century
Jet.
...as a designer, Boeing is preeminent...
I have great respect for them,
but they have a long way to go in
manufacturing. Therefore, to stay on
top, Boeing must find ways of building
planes better. If Boeing’s new
approach to design works, the 777
will be an efficient, economic plane
with a lot fewer bugs than new planes
usually have. As a result, Boeing
could save the millions it usually
spends fixing design problems during
production and after the plane
has been delivered to the airlines
(Main, 1992).
Boeing’s decision to use CATIA in conjunction
with a team concept emerged primarily
as a means of cutting costs after
analysis revealed that the predominant cost
drivers were rework on the factory floor and
down-stream changes. The teams that
Boeing calls design/build teams include representatives
from nearly every Boeing function
involved in producing the transport,
plus customers and suppliers (O’Lone,
1991).
Typically, engineers were still designing
when manufacturing began, and they kept
making changes as problems subsequently
came to light on the factory floor, on the
flight line, and even in the customer’s hands
after the plane was delivered. For example,
when Boeing delivered the 747-400 to
United in 1990, it had to assign 300 engineers
to get rid of bugs that it hadn’t spotted
earlier (Main, 1992). United was not
happy with Boeing’s late delivery of the 747,
nor with the additional costs the airline sustained
in rescheduling flights and compensating
unhappy customers as a result of
maintenance delays. Boeing was deeply
embarrassed by delivery delays and initial
service problems of its 747 (Proctor, 1994).
After a lot of research and deliberation, the
company decided to use computer aided
technology more extensively and change its
design and manufacturing approach in order
to improve its service. Yet, even though
CATIA and the team approach eventually
proved worthwhile, there were problems.
Boeing encountered problems in adjusting
to 100 percent computer-aided aircraft
design. Not only was this a technology
change, it was a cultural change. Condit said
engineers were reluctant to let others see
their drawings before they were 100 percent
complete (Condit, 1994). Ronald A.
Ostrowski, Director of Engineering for the
777 Division, said one of the initial challenges
was to:
...convert people’s thinking from 2-
D to 3-D. It took more time than we
thought it would. I came from a paper
world and now, I am managing a
digital program (Woolsey, 1994).
The software also had problems and development
costs ballooned slightly over
budget because of CATIA. Boeing CEO
Frank Shrontz said “It was not as user
friendly as we originally thought” (Woolsey,
1994).
CATIA and design/build teams were new
methods for applying technology that
pushed the envelope and could have impacted
Boeing’s delivery schedule. Instead
of allowing a possible schedule slip and late
delivery to its United customer, Boeing decided
to apply more resources, spend the
extra money, overcome its problems, and
deliver its 777 on schedule. While Boeing
did not state how much it spent, in April
1992 Fortune analysts identified $3 billion
(Main, 1992) set aside for research and development
(R&D) for the 777. In April
1994, an editorial in Aviation Week and
Space Technology estimated that final R&D
costs for the 777 approached $5.5 billion
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Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
(AW&ST, 1994). Based on the analysts
evaluations one could conclude that actual
R&D costs were approximately $2 billion
over planned costs. But, as Alan Mulally,
the Senior Vice President for Airplane Development
and Definition said:
In our business it’s very rare that you
can move the end point... When you
make a commitment like we made
they [United] lay out their plans for
a whole fleet of airplanes so it’s a big
deal. They’ll have plans to retire old
airplanes. We could have stretched
it out but it just seemed best to us to
keep the end date the same and add
some more resources (Mulally,
1994).
The wisdom of Mulally’s decision was
proven a thousand times over. The wing
assembly tool built by Giddings & Lewis in
Janesville, Wisconsin, and the world’s largest
C-frame riveting system built by Brotje
Automation of Germany, were both run in
Seattle on programs generated by the
CATIA (Benson, 1995). Engineers designed
parts and tools digitally on CATIA to verify
assembly fit. In Kansas, Boeing’s Wichita
Division built the lower lob, or belly, of the
777s nose section using CATIA and digital
preassembly. In Japan the skins of the airframe
were built using CATIA generated
programs. Workers at all plants marveled
at the way all the parts built by different
people all over the world fit together with
almost no need for rework (Benson, 1995).
Charlie Houser, product line manager at
Wichita, said it best:
CATIA and digital preassembly let
us find areas of potential interference
before we started production.
The individual assemblies fit together
extremely well, especially the
passenger floor. That assembly includes
composite floor beams, and
it went together smoother than any
floor grid of any size that we’ve ever
built in Wichita (Benson, 1995).
Engines
Three top companies will supply engines
for the Boeing 777: Pratt & Whitney, General
Electric, and Rolls Royce. The aircraft
was designed for two engines that are
billed as:
...the largest and most powerful ever
built, with the girth of a 737’s fuselage
and a thrust, or propulsive
power, of between 71,000 and 85,000
pounds compared with about 57,000
pounds of the latest 747 engine. Key
factors in this performance are new,
larger-diameter fans with wide-chord
fan blade designs and by-pass ratios
ranging from 6-to-1 to as high as 9-
to-1. The typical by-pass ratio for
today’s wide-body jet engines is 5-to-
1. Pratt & Whitney is furnishing the
PW4000 series of engines, General
Electric is offering the GE90 series
and Rolls-Royce is offering the Trent
800 series of engines (Donoghue,
1994).
Boeing’s success at getting these three
companies to produce engines never before
produced represent a dramatic change from
the time when the federal government was
the leader in technology. For example in the
1960s General Electric didn’t want to risk
the cost and time to develop a high-bypass
jet engine for the 747. General Electric was
content to let a military development program,
the C-5A, absorb the cost and time
associated with enhancing high-bypass jet
engine technology (Newhouse, 1982). For
the 777 Boeing not only pushed for new,
more powerful engines, it also pushed for
early approval from the Federal Aviation
Administration for the plane to fly over
oceans (called ETOPS: extended-range
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Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
twin-engine operations) (Mintz, 1995).
Normally, the FAA first certifies a twinengine
plane for flights of not more than
one hour from an airport, then two hours,
and finally, after a couple year’s service, a
full three hours so the plane could fly anywhere
in the world. The 767, powered by
Pratt & Whitney JT9D-7R4D/E turbofan
engines, became the first Boeing twin to win
120-minute approval in May, 1985, but not
until after it had flown for two years
(Woolsey, 1991). Jerry Zanatta, Director,
777 Flight Test Engineering, pointed out
that engines are so reliable today an airplane
could travel on only one engine.
Flying with two engines allows redundancy
that a pilot wants in order to ensure safety
of flight. Flying with more than two engines
only increases fuel cost and operating costs
unnecessarily. (Zanatta, 1994)
Why did Boeing push propulsion technology?
The answer is competition.
Boeing’s customer airlines are concerned
about operating costs and a two-engine
plane costs much less to operate than a
three- or four-engine plane. Boeing’s competition,
Airbus, has a twin-engine plane
(A330) (Duffy, 1994) that competes favorably
with the 777. If Boeing can’t deliver,
the Airbus can. Still, producing a new engine
was not without its problems. For example
the Pratt and Whitney engine had
performed perfectly in the testing laboratory;
but on its first test flight in November,
1993, it backfired several times.
The engine backfired because of differences
in the rates of thermal expansion between
the interior components of the engine
and the compressor case. The case
expanded faster than actively cooled interior
engine components creating a
space between the blades and the case.
After the first flight, engineers changed
the software commands that direct the
variable blade angle of the first four compressor
stages to reduce the temperature
of the air inside. On the next flight the engine
worked perfectly (Kandebo, 1993).
Summary of the Boeing Experience
Boeing looked at its investment in the
777 and its manufacturing process from a
tactical and strategic view. It was committed
to a successful 777 that would serve its
customers and protect its market share
against competition for 50 years into the
future. Boeing was also committed to
changing and improving its manufacturing
process using the power of computers so it
could improve quality and cut costs well into
the 21st century. As a result Boeing management
and its Board of Directors were
focused on what they had to do to make it
all happen. They were willing to commit
Boeing resources toward overcoming potential
challenges that included computer
and process technology.
When Boeing underestimated the challenge
of the design-build concept using
CATIA, it could have stretched the schedule
to spread additional costs over a longer
time period. But that would have meant
missing the delivery date to United for the
first 777. Boeing management made a conscious
decision to continue and learn on its
first block of 777s so that all future aircraft
could benefit.
We could have stretched it out, but
it just seemed best to us to keep the
end date the same and add some
more resources (Mulally 1994).
THE DOD APPROACH TO TECHNOLOGY
Technology on the C-17 was not as
well defined as some would have us
believe (Brig.Gen. Ron Kadish,
1994).
I was shocked in the Fall of 1992 to
discover that this airplane was being
produced from paper, that they did
not have a CAD/CAM system. That
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Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
they had never had a CAD/CAM
system (Gen. Ronald Fogleman,
1995).
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown justified
using a fixed-price incentive contract
to produce the C-17 for two reasons: (a)
Congress and President Carter wanted to
eliminate cost-plus contracts in order to
reduce excessive overruns (Hopkins, 1993),
and (b) all the technology for the C-17 was
already proven. The Advanced Medium
STOL Transport (AMST) prototypes
proved short-field take off and landing
(STOL) could work and all hardware and
software was off-the-shelf (Smith, 1993).
The Air Force request for proposal stated
that “...Undue complexity or technical risk
will be regarded as poor design...” (Johnson,
1986). After McDonnell Douglas won the
competition, this theme was carried over
into the C-17 technical planning guide:
The C-17’s systems are straightforward
in design, are highly reliable,
and represent current technology.
For example, a version of the C-17’s
engine has been proven in commercial
airline service since 1985. Newtechnology
systems, like the onboard
inert gas generating system
(OBIGGS), are used only where they
offer significant advantages over previous
methods....Avionics and flight
controls that include computer-controlled
multifunction displays and
head-up displays enable the aircraft
to be flown and all its missions accomplished
with a flight crew of only
two pilots and one loadmaster
(McDonnell Douglas, 1993).
However, the C-17 experience revealed
what studies conducted during the AMST
had proven and Kadish had pointed out—
”the technology was not as well defined as
some would lead us to believe.” Although
McDonnell Douglas did not develop new
technologies for the C-17, the way in which
the technologies were used was new. The
C-17 was a new cargo airlifter dependent
on a complex integrated avionics system to
reduce the aircrew size to two pilots and a
cargo loadmaster. By comparison the C-141
and the C-5 use two pilots, a navigator for
tactical and airdrop missions (C-141 only),
two flight engineers, and two cargo loadmasters
when carrying passengers (Moen
and Lossi, 1995). Also, using STOL capability
on a plane expected to fly 2,400 nautical
miles (NM) with a 172,200-pound payload
to include outsized cargo was much different
than using STOL on a plane expected
to fly a 400-mile radius with a 27,000-pound
payload. The plane would require a new
wing and, as John Newhouse points out in
his book, The Sporty Game, “...there is more
technology in the wing than in any other part
of an airframe...production schedules are
keyed to wings” (Newhouse, 1982). The differences
in design between a tactical STOL
and a strategic STOL were the catalysts that
caused schedule slips and cost money.
Advanced Medium STOL Transport
The AMST was the genesis for the C-17.
In 1971 the Air Force contracted both
Boeing and McDonnell Douglas to build a
prototype that, in the words of Gen.
Carlton, was “really a miniature C-5”
(Kennedy, undated) to transport cargo intheater.
The plane was to fly a 400 NM
radius mission, carry 27,000 pounds, and
land on short runways using short landing
and take-off (STOL) technology.
McDonnell Douglas’ YC-15 and Boeing’s
YC-14 prototypes successfully demonstrated
powered lift technology in 1975
that met mission requirements (Kennedy,
undated). In March, 1976, the Air Force
Chief of Staff Gen. David C. Jones asked
Air Force Systems Command to see if it was
possible to use a single model of the AMST
for both strategic and tactical airlift roles,
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Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
and if it was possible to develop non-STOL
derivatives of the AMST prototype to meet
strategic airlift missions (Jones, 1976). It appears
that this strategic study originated
with a note from the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Gen. George S. Brown, that
asked “Is it practical to have an AMST with
a slightly higher box pick up much of the C-
5 outsized load for Europe—with air refueling
as necessary?” (Lemaster, 1976).
Gordon Taylor and Gordon Quinn from
the Aeronautical Systems Division at
Wright Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio,
were leaders in a conceptual design analysis
to determine if DoD could use the
AMST for strategic missions. The analysis
included reviewing the ability to carry the
M-60 Main Battle tank, weighing 110,000
to 117,000 pounds, on a routine basis with
ranges from 2,000 NM, 3,000 NM, and 4,000
NM. Taylor and Quinn concluded that using
a derivative aircraft in a routine strategic
airlift role would increase AMST
weight and cost significantly. To restructure
the AMST from a tactical to a strategic
program would require full-scale development
(a larger wing, heavier structure,
and different aerodynamics). Even
in a non-STOL capacity the wing was the
major airframe component that the study
said must undergo considerable change
(Taylor and Quinn, 1976). In May 1976,
Brig.Gen. Philip Larsen, Deputy Chief of
Staff, Systems, Air Force Systems Command,
wrote:
It would not be cost effective to incorporate
a STOL capability in a
strategic airlift derivative aircraft. A
strategic derivative could employ a
less complex conventional flap system
which would permit CTOL [conventional
takeoff and landing] operations
from an 8,000 foot hard surface
runway under sea level standard
day conditions. The aircraft would be
stretched eight feet to provide a 55-
foot-long cargo compartment. This
would permit routinely carrying the
M-60 tank and single item payloads
up to 112,500 pounds, or 14 463L
cargo pallets, for distances up to
3,000 NM without refueling. In this
particular example, it would be necessary
to increase... YC-15 wing area
69 percent and gross weight 115 percent...
(Larsen, 1976).
On December 10, 1979, Program Management
Directive (PMD) No. R-Q 6131(3)
formally cancelled the AMST program. On
that same day PMD No. R-C 0020(1) provided
formal direction and guidance for
activities leading to Full Scale Engineering
Development of the C-X. PMD R-C
0020(1) directed that the C-X skip Milestone
I and the Demonstration and Validation
phase because “...the new aircraft will
use existing technology... since the Air Force
had demonstrated and proved advanced
technology concepts and operational utility
in the AMST program” (Johnson, 1986).
Changing Payload Requirements
Payload requirements changed at least
five times over the life of the C-17. Beginning
in 1981 the request for purchase asked
for a STOL plane that could carry a payload
of 130,000 pounds (AMC, 1993).
McDonnell Douglas claimed it could produce
a STOL plane that could carry 172,200
pounds 2400 miles (Johnson, 1986). When
the contract was awarded in 1982, the payload
requirements were changed to 172,200
pounds (AMC, 1993). DoD did not evaluate
the cost to grow from a payload of
130,000 pounds to 172,200 pounds. In 1988
DoD changed the payload requirement
from 172,200 pounds to 167,000 in order to
accommodate the addition of a 4-pallet
ramp and OBIGGS that added 5,000
pounds additional weight to the aircraft
(Snider, 1992). In 1991 Gen. Hansford
Johnson, MAC Commander, reduced the
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Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
payload requirements from 167,000 pounds
to 160,000 pounds because the kinds of
equipment MAC needed to haul over essential
routes—from West Coast bases to
Hickam AFB, Hawaii, and from East Coast
bases to Lajes airfield in the Azores—did
not require a plane with a 167,000-pound
capacity. He said:
This was not a reassessment of requirements
as much as it was a refinement
of the original requirements...
McDonnell Douglas, in
competing for the contract, offered
more than what MAC needed....All
of us, being eager to do more, said
sure, we’ll write the specs at the
higher level (Morrocco, 1991).
In January 1995, DoD, Congress, and
McDonnell Douglas agreed to decrease the
payload requirement even more. If the C-
17 were to carry a 160,000-pound payload
using short-field take-off and landing capability
with the weight of the plane and the
required fuel, it needed more powerful engines.
Pratt & Whitney and Rolls Royce,
had produced more powerful engines, but
the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
John M. Deutch, said changing to
more powerful engines was too costly. He
preferred to reduce payload specifications
rather than change engines, especially since
the C-17 did not need to carry a greater
payload to perform its mission (Morrocco,
1994). Fogleman said that DoD “...allowed
the plane to be over spec’d unnecessarily....
We didn’t need a plane to carry a 172,200-
pound payload then and we don’t need a
plane to carry 160,000 pounds now”
(Fogleman, 1995).
An absolute critical leg for us in this
new world we are living in is how
much can this airplane carry 3,200
miles...we established a 110,000-
pound payload threshold at the
3,200-mile range... The original requirement
set in the early 1980s was
for a 130,000-pound payload, the
weight of an M-1 tank then....this
specification is now not considered
the most critical. It was linked to the
Cold War goal of transporting 10
Army divisions to Europe in 10 days,
rather than how to deal with the
types of regional contingencies the
Pentagon now is focusing on in its
planning. An absolute critical leg for
us in this new world we are living in
is how much can this airplane carry
3,200 miles.... So we established a
110,000-pound payload threshold at
the 3,200-mile range which did not
exist before...the aircraft meets that
goal and is projected to exceed it.
Sticking to the original specification
would have required switching to
more powerful engines (Morrocco,
1994).
On January 17, 1995, the Air Mobility
Commander, Gen. Robert Rutherford, declared
the C-17 a success when he certified
it operationally capable (McDonnell Douglas,
1995). It’s worth noting, however, that
the program did not begin to overcome
technology problems until after top-level
commitment was apparent from principals
like Deutch (Defense Week, 1995) and
Fogleman. Fogleman essentially said this is
nonsense, “...we don’t need that much payload
capability...” (Fogleman, 1995), and
Deutch arranged a settlement with
McDonnell Douglas that allowed performance
trade-offs and help with computer
(CAD/CAM) technology. McDonnell
Douglas, in turn, put their best people on
the job to produce a technically proficient
airplane (Morrocco, 1994). As a result of
technology trade-offs and top management
commitment from both DoD and
the contractor, the C-17 exceeded its
schedule during 1994 and met mission
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Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
requirements in 1995.
Technical Problems
One might say that design problems and
planning problems were at the root of technical
problems that added time to development
of the C-17. The underlying problem
was that the players underestimated the
technical challenges. Roger A. Panton,
Chief of Engineering at the C-17 System
Program Office at Wright Patterson AFB,
said “Our primary technical problem with
the C-17 was integration. We grabbed too
much off the shelf and tried to put it together”
(Panton, 1994). Critical off-theshelf
technology included fly-by-wire, advanced
materials, engines, software, and the
powered lift that the McDonnell Douglas
YC-15 prototype demonstrated in 1975.
The Defense Science Board added in a
December 1993 report that lack of computer
aided design and engineering changes
contributed to production delays (Defense
Science Board, 1993). Deutch summarized
some of the most glaring weaknesses as: (a)
technical risks involved in flight test software
and avionics integration; (b) structural
deficiencies in the wings, flaps and slats; and
(c) uncertainty of flight test program requirements
(Morrocco, 1993).
Avionics Integration
Avionics is a term that covers the
myriad of ultrarefined electronic
devices on which modern airplanes
rely... (Newhouse, 1982).
On the C-17 that includes the flight control
system and the mission computer. Integration
of the mission computer and electronic
flight control system was one of the
three critical paths leading to first flight
(Smith, 1990). The first test flight of the C-
17, September 15, 1991, was behind schedule
(Smith, 1991) because of problems that
included changing from a standard mechanical
flight control system to a quadruple
redundant electronic flight control system,
and delays in the mission computer software
and flight control software (Hopkins and De
Keyrel, 1993).
In 1987, after McDonnell Douglas
missed delivery of the first test aircraft, DoD
reduced funding during budget reductions
and moved delivery schedule for the first
test aircraft three years to the right (to July,
1990) (Mastin, 1994). In addition, in January
1988, Congress deducted $20 million
from the C-17 during its budget review, but
invited DoD to ask for reprogramming of
funds (SAF/AQ, 1989). DoD declined.
Flight Control System
McDonnell Douglas changed to an electronic
flight-control system to prevent the
plane from entering into a deep stall
(Hopkins and De Keyrel, 1993). Wind tunnel
testing revealed that the C-17 design
caused deep stall characteristics. In 1987 the
Sperry Corporation (the flight-control subcontractor)
told McDonnell Douglas that
the mechanical flight control system could
not prevent pilots from putting the airplane
into an irreversible stall (ASD/AF/C-17,
1987). After confirming that the aircraft
configuration and the mechanical flight control
system could allow the aircraft to enter
an uncontrollable stall during certain tactical
maneuvers, Douglas directed Sperry to
change the mechanical flight control to a
fly-by-wire system (Smith, 1993). During
this same period Honeywell, Incorporated,
purchased the Sperry Corporation.
In June 1989, Honeywell officials established
April 25, 1991, as the new delivery
date for flight qualified software. The additional
delay added four years from the time
Douglas first asked for the system change
until delivery (1987-1991). Even though
Honeywell successfully completed an interface
control document (ICD) in July 1989,
showing how the electronic flight control system
(EFCS) interacted with subsystems, the
additional delay was too much. Brig.Gen.
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Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
Michael Butchko, Air Force C-17 Program
Manager, convinced Douglas Aircraft to hire
General Electric (GE) for development of a
similar system as a precautionary measure
(Hopkins and De Keyrel, 1993). Douglas
ended Honeywell’s contract for the EFCS in
July 1989 (Thomas, et al., 1990). GE delivered
the version 1 software for integration
testing in October, 1990 (Thompson, 1991).
Mission Control Computer
The three mission computers receive
data from other systems, analyze data, perform
calculations, and display information
to the pilot and copilot. The computers act
as the heart of the automated avionics system
and perform functions normally done
by the flight engineer such as determining
an estimate of position and velocity, weight
limits, airdrop, small airfield approaches,
and system management (Thomas, et al.,
1990). Each mission computer performs its
calculations and then compares its results
with the solutions broadcast over the data
bus by the other two computers (McDonnell
Douglas, 1993).
Douglas awarded a firm-fixed-price contract
to Delco in July, 1986, to develop the
mission computer (Mundell, 1990). In August
1988, an independent review team that
included personnel from McDonnell Douglas,
Hughes Electronics, and the Air Force
concluded that Delco had not adequately
accomplished system engineering and that
McDonnell Douglas had not adequately
defined the mission computer system requirements.
Delco developed the mission
computer software enough to hold a critical
design review of the detail design in
April, 1989 for the first of two increments
of software, but it would not commit to a
plan for completing the mission computer.
In July 1989, Douglas and Delco signed an
agreement that partially terminated Delco’s
contract for the mission computer subsystem,
and Douglas assumed responsibility
for managing the overall software development
effort (Thomas, 1990).
McDonnell Douglas subcontracted a
majority of software for the C-17 to subcontractors
and suppliers. During this process
Douglas did not specify a specific computer
language, which resulted in software for the
C-17 in almost every known language of the
time (AW&ST, 1992). Integration of the software
was a nightmare that GAO said resulted
in “...the most computerized, software-intensive
aircraft ever built, relying on 19 different
embedded computers incorporating
more than 80 microprocessors and about 1.3
million lines of code” (Hopkins and De
Keyrel, 1993). The final software release
was in September, 1994 with upgrades
through March 1995. David J. Lynch, in his
article “Airlift’s Year of Decision,” said that
in 1994 the mission computer remained
slow and did not meet the desired throughput
capacity requirements (Lynch, 1994).
John Wilson, C-17 Deputy Program Manager,
acknowledged that the program office
needs to consider software improvements:
This is a tough area. The C-17 System
Program Office recognizes that
additional throughput could be beneficial.
Although the computer performs
the basic mission, it is slow and
does not meet the desired throughput
capacity. We are working the
area (Wilson, 1995).
Wings
The wings, flaps, and slats combine with
high thrust engines and the electronic flight
control system for short take-off and landing
(STOL). Exhaust from the jet engines
force air over wings and flaps, generating
additional lift. Engines on the C-17 are
mounted under the wings and large flaps
protrude down into the exhaust stream. The
engine exhaust is forced through the flap
and down both sides of the flap, creating
significant added lift. The externally blown
flap system and the full-span leading edge
225
Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
slats enable the C-17 to operate at low approach
speeds for short-field landings and
for airdrops (Henderson, 1990). Powered
lift enables the C-17 to land on shorter runways
than current, large-capacity transports
by allowing it to fly slow, steep approaches
to highly accurate touchdown points
(McDonnell Douglas, 1993). In October
1992, the wing failed a wing-strength test
(Morrocco, 1993). Even though Air Force
had reduced the maximum payload requirements
in December, 1989 from 167,000
pounds to 160,000 pounds at 2,400 NM, the
wings were still not strong enough to handle
a full payload (GAO, 1994) along with the
fuel and structure weight at a 1.5 safety factor.
Causes of the failure included a computational
error in the initial design, optimistic
design assumptions, and the method
used to determine compression stress
(Huston, et al., 1993). The wing modifications
covered a large area because
McDonnell Douglas used the erroneous
computation throughout the wing structure
(Smith, 1993).
The failed strength test was preceded by
persistent fuel leaks around the wing in September,
1991, because holes were not drilled
and fastened properly. Douglas held up delivery
of Production Aircraft for nearly a
month while technicians located the leaks.
Jim Berry, then Douglas vice-president and
general manager of the C-17 program, said
the problems stemmed primarily from a lack
of production discipline and unscheduled
work. The failed wing-strength test and persistent
fuel leaks around the wing cost
McDonnell Douglas more than $1 billion,
and modifications added an additional 700
pounds in aircraft weight (Smith, 1993).
Summary of the DoD Experience
DoD did not look at its investment in the
C-17 from a technically strategic view, nor
did it appreciate the challenge of C-17
STOL technology. When DoD changed the
mission of the tactical STOL to a strategic
STOL, both McDonnell Douglas and the
Department of Defense underestimated the
scope and cost of the effort necessary to
reduce the aircrew size to three persons and
fly 2,400 NM with a 172,200-pound payload.
As Fogleman said, DoD “...allowed the
plane to be over spec’d unnecessarily....We
didn’t need a plane to carry a 172,200-
pound payload then and we don’t need a
plane to carry 160,000 pounds now”
(Fogleman, 1995). In both cases (reducing
aircrew size and requiring STOL)
McDonnell Douglas had to increase its use
of computerized flight controls in order to
maximize performance. In all cases lack of
experience with software caused schedule
delays and increased cost. In addition a
math error caused problems that prevented
the C-17 wing from passing the stress test
at 150 percent. If McDonnell Douglas had
a CAD/CAM system like CATIA, it might
have detected and prevented both the stress
problems and the fuel leak problems.
CONTRASTING THE DOD
AND BOEING APPROACHES
Boeing’s focus during the design and acquisition
process was on cost, schedule, performance,
and market competition. DoD’s
focus during the design and acquisition process
was on performance. Boeing looked at
the technology included in its airplane more
realistically and did not try to include more
than the market would buy. DoD, on the
other hand, gold-plated requirements by
providing more capacity than the customer
needed, and underestimated the STOL
technology and cost needed to carry a
172,200-pound payload. Boeing used the
CATIA computer program to help revolutionize
its design and manufacturing plant
so that parts would fit right, and built an
entirely new plant to integrate and test its
new avionics package. Boeing’s investment
in infrastructure helped overcome its many
226
Acquisition Review Quarterly – Summer 1995
computer and avionics problems. DoD’s
contractor, McDonnell Douglas, designed
the C-17 on paper. McDonnell Douglas did
not use a computer program that could have
identified and helped eliminate both the
wing stress and the fuel leak problems, and
it did not adequately plan integration of the
C-17 avionics package.
When Boeing underestimated the time
and cost to overcome technical problems
in the 777 fly-by-wire and CATIA, it determined
what it needed to do to correct the
problems. Boeing decided to meet its delivery
date to United, and commit additional
money and resources to solve the
technical problems. DoD, on the other
hand, upon learning that McDonnell
Douglas could not meet its first scheduled
flight because of technical problems
that included software and STOL design,
took money away from the program and
stretched it out three years.
Jacques Gansler in his book, Affording
Defense, explains how DoD’s preoccupation
with technology is self defeating:
...the unreasonably long acquisition
cycle (10-15 years)...leads to unnecessary
development costs, to increased
“gold plating,” and to the
fielding of obsolete technology
(Gansler, 1989).
What happens is that DoD takes so long
to overcome technology problems that by
the time a weapon is complete, the technology
is outdated. In the case of the C-17,
that’s true. It is the most versatile up-to-date
cargo plane the U.S. currently has, but DoD
couldn’t produce the C-17 until the technology
problems of design, fly-by-wire,
embedded computer systems, and wing
stress were solved. As a result, Boeing completed
the 777 at about the same time even
though it was conceived several years after
the C-17. The 777 uses the same level of
technology or, as with flat-panel displays,
computer-design, increased propulsion,
and manufacturing processes, it uses more
advanced technology.
Jacques Gansler describes the dilemma
between the Defense and commercial approach
to technology in his illustration of
a college student working in the commercial
world versus one who works for defense.
A typical American engineering student
(graduate or undergraduate) is
taught how to design the “best system.”
Using computers, sophisticated
mathematics, and all their engineering
skills, these students set
out to design systems that will
achieve the maximum performance.
If they enter the commercial world,
they are taught that their designs
should be modified to reduce the
likely costs of production and operation.
However, if they enter the defense
world, they continue to use the
design practices they learned in
school, and cost-cutting becomes an
exercise for the manufacturer
(Gansler, 1989).
If DoD continues its past preoccupation
with technology, it will fall behind. In the
past commercial development programs
leveraged the technology developed by
the military; this was certainly true for the
777 fly-by-wire. However, the military is
now learning from commercial developers.
The F-22 and other acquisition programs
are using the integrated product
teams that Boeing developed in its design-
build approach. The F-22, the B-2,
and the V-22 Osprey are all benefitting
from CATIA and the strides Boeing made in
composite manufacturing. However, the programs
are not benefitting from Boeing’s design-
to-cost approach.
227
Technology Approach: DoD Versus Boeing
CONCLUSIONS
Did the difference in approaches to technology
contribute to the length of time it
took to develop the DoD C-17 compared
to the Boeing 777? One would have to say
yes. The most telling difference was how
Boeing and DoD reacted to technical problems
that threatened to impact delivery
dates. Boeing added more resources to
overcome technical problems whereas DoD
took resources away and moved the delivery
date out three years. As long as DoD
overestimates the maturity of technology it
wants to use, asks for more technology than
it needs, does not commit resources to overcome
technology problems in a timely manner,
and does not require cost, schedule, and
technology trade-offs during evolution of
the design, it will take longer to develop
weapon systems.
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